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FINAL CAUSES refer to purposes or goals. Typically, citing the final
cause answers the question “why?” Why do I go to the grocery store? In
order to buy food. Why does the heart beat? In order to pump blood
around the body. Final causes therefore refer to the purposes or goals of
natural substances, agents, or systems. For example, the human immune
system has the goal of maintaining the health of the body; the artist’s
purpose is to produce paintings or sculptures. While nature’s ends domi-
nate the thought of Plato, Aristotle, and their ancient and medieval
successors, it was not until the eighteenth century that the philosophical
study of final causes became known as “teleology.”1
The history of teleology is complex. In contrast to the Presocratics,
who are frequently described as materialists with little or no sense of final
causes or purposes in nature,2 Plato and Aristotle place teleology at the
Nova et Vetera, English Edition, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2013): 849–70 849
1 The term teleologia is not conclusively attested until 1728 when, in his Philosophia
Rationalis, Sive Logica, Christian Wolff uses the term to refer to a branch of natu-
ral philosophy which deals with the ends of things. Although obviously anachro-
nistically, Aristotle’s causes “for the sake of which” are frequently included under
the broad banner of “teleology.”
2 An alternative to this common reading of the Presocratics is provided by David
Sedley, Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity (Los Angeles: University of Califor-
nia Press, 2007), chaps. 1–2. Sedley argues that this view may have more to do
with Plato’s and Aristotle’s description of their predecessors than with the posi-
tion of the Presocratics as revealed in their texts. Aristotle states that “Democri-
tus, however, omitted to mention the Final Cause, and so all the things which
Nature employs he refers to necessity. It is of course true that they are deter-
mined by necessity, but at the same time they are for the sake of some purpose,
some Final Cause, and for the sake of that which is better in each case.” Aristotle,
Generation of Animals, trans. A. L. Peck (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
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heart of their respective philosophies. In antiquity and the Middle Ages,
teleological cosmology in various guises was central to the philosophical
enquiry into nature and the Christian doctrine of creation. Following
Western Christianity’s renewed acquaintance with Aristotle’s works in
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Philosopher’s understanding of
causation became particularly influential. His intricate blending of mate-
rial, efficient, formal, and final causes offered a comprehensive account of
creaturely phenomena and gave Christian teachers the means to under-
stand created causes in analogical relation to divine actuality. However,
this approach to causation did not last. It is common to describe the
demise of the mediaeval consensus and the rise of modern philosophy in
terms of shifts in the understanding of causation, with the rejection of
Aristotelian final causes and the explanatory dominance of efficient
causation being key to this transition. Nevertheless, despite the apparent
abandonment of final causes in early modern thought, exemplified, for
example, in the work of Francis Bacon,3 the question concerning teleol-
ogy is far from settled in contemporary philosophy, psychology, and natu-
ral science.4 Any investigation of final causation, which must perforce
attend to Aristotle and his legacy, is of considerable importance to
contemporary thought in numerous spheres.
In this essay, I will discuss Aristotle’s understanding of final causation
and Aquinas’s deployment of this aspect of the Philosopher’s thought. Like
Aristotle, Aquinas regards final causes as basic and fundamental to any
adequate explanation of creaturely phenomena because “Every agent, of
1953), V.8, 789b4–b15. See Plato, Phaedo 98c–99d. However, Sedley seems to read
these texts through the lens of the very modern concept of intelligent design.
Unlike the Presocratics, Plato and Aristotle understood final causes not in rela-
tion to an extrinsic design or designer of anthropomorphic variety (assuming a
non-literal reading of the Timaeus), but as intrinsic to all aspects of creation,
whether animate or inanimate, yet orientated to a transcendent good.
3 See, for example, Francis Bacon, The New Organon, ed. Lisa Jardine and Michael
Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Book II, aphorism
2, p. 102. On modern thinkers’ ambivalence concerning final causes, see Margaret
Osler, “From Immanent Natures to Nature as Artifice: The Reinterpretation of
Final Causes in Seventeenth Century Natural Philosophy,” The Monist 79 (1996):
388–407. Osler is not sufficiently clear concerning the kinds of final causes
which remain influential in the thought of, for example, Robert Boyle, Isaac
Newton, and Gottfried Leibniz. They are somewhat removed from final causes
as conceived by Aristotle and Aquinas. In particular, final causes in early modern
natural philosophy are not allied to formal causes.
4 See, for example, Mark Perlman, “The Modern Philosophical Resurrection of
Teleology,” The Monist 87 (2004): 3–51, and Ernst Mayr, “The Idea of Teleology,”
Journal of the History of Ideas 53 (1992): 117–35.
necessity, acts for an end.”5 I will first outline Aristotle’s teleological
understanding of the natural. We will see that, for Aristotle, final causes are
properly intelligible only in relation to an equally fundamental formal
causation. I will be particularly concerned with the distinction between
internal and external teleology. It is by means of this distinction that Aris-
totle divides the natural from the artificial. Although the division between
internal and external teleology becomes very important in modern
philosophy, I will argue that, for Aristotle, internal and external teleology
do not always stand over and against each other in dualistic fashion.
Following this discussion of Aristotle, I will examine Aquinas’s deploy-
ment of Aristotelian teleology allied to dynamic substantial form with a
particular focus on the doctrine of grace. Once again, I will be concerned
to show that Aquinas resists a dualism of internal and external final causes,
particularly in the field of divine causation. He thereby resists any sense of
a discrete and autonomous nature that lies outside the field of divine grace
which leads human beings to the vision of God. The unification of inter-
nal and external ends is found most profoundly and salvifically in the
Incarnation, for in Christ we find the way, the truth, and the life.
Aristotelian Final Causes
In discussing Aristotelian causation we are used to the standard terminol-
ogy of the “four causes”: the material cause, the efficient cause, the formal
cause, and the final cause.6 Although I will use these laconic terms in what
follows, they are not Aristotle’s but rather the invention of other ancient
philosophers and their scholastic heirs.7 Aristotle describes not the four
causes, but the different modes into which cause falls. The cause “out of
which” something comes to be is matter. The primary source of motion—
or, literally, the “whence the source of motion or rest”—is later labelled the
efficient cause. The examples Aristotle gives of this mode of cause are a
smith fashioning metal or a father begetting a child.8 These are the prime
agents which produce an effect; they immediately precede it in time.9
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5 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I–II, q. 1, a. 2, responsio: “omnia agentia
necesse est agere propter finem.” See also, for example, ST I, q. 5, a. 4; I, q. 19, a.
4, responsio; Aristotle, Physics II.5, 196b21.
6 Aristotle, MetaphysicsV.2.
7 For example, Philoponus states that, “He sums up in brief form what has been
said, [saying] that the types of the enumerated causes are four: the material cause,
the formal, the efficient, the final.” Philoponus, On Aristotle’s Physics 2, trans. A.
R. Lacey (London: Duckworth, 1993), 245.25 (p. 59).
8 Aristotle, Physics II.3, 194b25.
9 Unlike modern theories of causation, Aristotle does not think of causes as events.
An example of a causal event might be the fusing of the sperm and ovum which 
When Aristotle refers to the form as a cause, he means the “what it is to be
something.”10 In other words, the form is that which makes something a
“this” rather than a “that,” and it indicates that, for Aristotle, nature is not
merely composed of matter in different discrete arrangements.
Form is closely associated with nature itself. For Aristotle, nature is
“the distinctive form or quality of such things as have within themselves
a principle of motion, such form or characteristic property not being
separable from the things themselves, save conceptually.”11 In stipulating
that the form is within the organism, Aristotle is distinguishing those
things which are by nature from those things which are manufactured.
Art does indeed imitate nature, but Aristotle uses the craft analogy as
much to draw attention to the differences between human artefacts and
natural entities as he does to draw attention to their similarities. In the
case of human artefacts such as beds (to use Aristotle’s example), it seems
that the form has its source outside the artefact, namely in the mind of
the craftsman, and is imposed upon an existing matter-form compound
such as wood. In nature, form is not layered upon a more essential
substratum; it emerges from within, passing from potentiality to actuality.
Within the hylomorphic compound, the irreducibility of form to matter
is crucial to Aristotle’s view of nature and distinguishes his approach from
classical modern science.
When it comes to that which we label the final cause, Aristotle uses
the phrase “the cause for the sake of which.”12 For example, I might fash-
ion a sculpture for the sake of decorating my hallway. Within this “cause
for the sake of which,” Aristotle makes a crucial distinction between the
goal as the aim of an action (“that of which”) and the goal as the bene-
ficiary (“that for which”).13 For example, the aim of the art of medicine
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brings about a zygote, then a blastocyst, a fetus, and so on. Rather, he cites things
or principles as causes.
10 Aristotle, Physics II.3, 194b25–b30.
11 Aristotle, Physics, trans. P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1957), II.1, 193b1–b5. Unless otherwise indicated, all transla-
tions of Aristotle are from the Loeb Classical Library editions of his works.
12 Aristotle, Physics II.3, 194b30–b35; MetaphysicsV.2, 1013a34.
13 Aristotle, De Anima II.4, 415b1–b7. See also Physics II.2, 194a35–b3; Metaphysics
XII.7, 1072b2–b6. A detailed discussion of this distinction is available in Monte
Ransome Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005),
especially chap. 3. Johnson claims that Aquinas misunderstands the distinction in
his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (71, n.17). However, Aquinas’s text of
Aristotle appears to be missing the crucial remark. Elsewhere, notably in his
commentary on Aristotle’s De anima and in the ST, it is evident that Aquinas is
fully aware of Aristotle’s distinction. See Aquinas, In De anima, II.7, 124–41; ST
I–II, q. 1, a. 8, responsio.
is health. The beneficiary of the art of medicine (“that for which”) is the
patient. The builder who constructs a house has the house as his aim or
goal. At the same time, there is another end, namely the person who will
benefit from the shelter which the house provides. This distinction is
important for Aristotle in a number of respects. For example, in Meta-
physics Λ it can be seen that the first unmoved mover is the end of motion
not in the sense of being a beneficiary (because, in being fully actual, the
first unmoved mover cannot benefit from anything) but in the sense of
being the aim or focus of desire.
The link between the final cause—the “cause for the sake of which”—
and form is made very explicit and straightforward by Aristotle: “the form
is the final cause.”14 How do form and the final cause relate? Form is
intrinsic to any natural entity; it is already possessed potentially rather than
actually. So the acorn becomes an oak and not a birch because it has within
itself the form of oak tree in its potential aspect. The actualization of form
by means of passage from potency to act is crucial to Aristotle’s natural
philosophy and it is the basis of his distinction between natural and violent
motion.15 Natural motions are those characteristic patterns of behavior
which are produced by a being in a given environment; the being in ques-
tion has a certain intrinsic receptivity for “natural” motion because this
kind of motion actualizes a form which is held potentially. For example,
the acorn has a natural receptivity to becoming an oak by means of water-
ing and nourishment from its environment. By contrast, a violent motion
is one in which there is no intrinsic receptivity to that motion within or
by the being itself. It is contrary to something’s formal nature. Such violent
or non-natural motions may be due to chance or extrinsic force.
So through form it seems that natural entities are always already orien-
tated in specific directions and towards specific ends. There is an intrin-
sic receptivity within natural entities towards the actualization of their
form. We might say that the acorn intends to become an oak, or a cygnet
a swan, or a rock intends its appropriate low place. It is the intrinsic char-
acter of form which distinguishes natural entities from artificial entities.
For the artificial, the goal is external; it lies outside the artefact, first in the
mind of a designer or craftsman. In later philosophy, this becomes a
distinction between internal and external which marks a division in
different kinds of teleology. For Kant and Hegel, external teleology, such
as the design of a chair or a pen, presents little difficulty. One ascribes the
orientation of material towards certain ends through a human intention-
ality and purpose which lies outside the material elements of an artefact.
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14 Aristotle, Physics II.8, 199a33.
15 Aristotle, Physics IV.8, 215a1–a25. See also PhysicsV.6, 231a5–a10.
By contrast, internal teleology is regarded as more problematic: is it
merely an anthropomorphic projection based on the purposive orienta-
tion of human craftsmanship? Teleology might be regarded as an heuris-
tic device for the understanding of nature which will last as long as an
explanation in terms of efficient causality eludes us.16 Later in this essay,
we will see that the division between intrinsic and extrinsic teleology
holds potential theological risks with regards to the doctrine of grace, but
that Aquinas resists this dualism. However, to what extent does Aristotle
resist a dualism between intrinsic and extrinsic teleology, despite his insis-
tence on intrinsic real natures and their distinction from human artifice?
At first glance, it seems that teleology, because it seems to require some
notion of “intention,” belongs particularly to the animate realm. Regard-
ing inanimate substances, they become teleological only in relation to their
use by, or incorporation into, animate substances (for example, a plant’s use
of nutrients in the soil). In this sense, the ends of inanimate substances are
external. The ascription of intention to any non-human creature raises the
specter of anthropomorphic projection which can lead to the postulation
of some kind of vitalism. A vital force is regarded as a mere metaphysical
accretion—the postulating of a mysterious impetus which apparently
orientates things towards certain ends yet which explains nothing.
However, there is a notion of appetition (orexis) in Aristotle which indi-
cates an intrinsic orientation of animate and inanimate natural entities
towards the fulfilment of their formal natures. In the Eudemian Ethics Aris-
totle asks, “How can one suppose that things not possessing life can have
appetition?”17 In the passage concerned, he is discussing whether there is,
as the Platonists supposed, a universal good to which all things tend
through appetition or desire. He concludes that there is no such universal
good but that all things tend towards their particular good: the eye desires
854 Simon Oliver
16 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric
Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), §77, p. 275: “certain
products of nature, as far as their possibility is concerned, must, given the partic-
ular constitution of our understanding, be considered by us as intentional and
generated as ends, yet without thereby demanding that there actually is a partic-
ular cause that has the representation of an end as its determining ground, and
thus without denying that another (higher) understanding than the human one
might be able to find the ground of the possibility of such products of nature
even in the mechanism of nature . . .” Page numbers refer to the translation. The
interpretation of Kant’s intricate understanding of teleology, which falls beyond
the bounds of this essay, remains contested. 
17 Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, I.8, 1218a25. My discussion of orexis, including this
citation of Eudemian Ethics, is indebted to John M. Rist, “Some Aspects of Aris-
totelian Teleology,” Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Associa-
tion 96 (1965): 337–49, esp. 338–40.
sight, the body health. These examples clearly pertain to animate, living
substances even if the eye is not itself animate. Is there any sense for Aris-
totle that all things, animate and inanimate, have an intrinsic appetition
towards particular goals? While it is of course true that Aristotle distin-
guishes between the animate and the inanimate, life and the lifeless, often
through the claim that self-motion indicates life, nevertheless it is the case
that he has no concept of absolute inert and indifferent matter in anything
like the Newtonian sense of the term. Such matter would be, in Aristotle’s
terms, devoid of form and therefore purely potential. A pure potentiality
cannot exist because it is in absolute potential even to being. Matter is
always en-formed in the sense of being in potency to some things and not
to others, and therefore orientated to certain ends and not others.
The issue of the orientation of things towards certain ends and the
question concerning their appetition for their appropriate end is impor-
tant in the discussion of the motion of inanimate bodies in the Physics.
When a projectile is thrown from the hand, after it has left the hand, what
is it which preserves the motion of the projectile? When I drop a heavy
object, what is it that moves the object downwards? The problem of
projectile motion was much discussed in ancient philosophy and solved
through the principle of impetus by later thinkers such as Philoponus, and
the concepts of inertia and gravity in Newtonian mechanics. However,
amongst the medieval philosophers one principle of Aristotelian natural
philosophy, often deployed in considering projectile motion, caused much
confusion: omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, whatever is moved is moved
by another.18 This principle was sometimes interpreted to mean that
whatever is in motion, is here and now being moved by another. On this
view, when the projectile leaves the hand of the thrower, it must continue
to have some kind of mover connected to it to move it through the air.
One theory was that the air moving around the projectile provided the
moving force. The notion of a constantly conjoined mover would imply
that there is no orexis intrinsic to inanimate substances. However, no such
mover is required in the case of natural motion. Instead, the mover is that
which first donated or actualized to some degree something’s form. For
example, there is a sense in which a father is always the mover of his son
because the father is the generator of his son; he is the source of his son’s
form. In claiming that everything that is moved is moved by another, Aris-
totle is suggesting that all creatures are in some sense potential, and the
actualization of their potential cannot be accounted for by reference to
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18 Aristotle, PhysicsVII.1, 241b24–25. For an extended discussion of this principle,
see Simon Oliver, Philosophy, God and Motion (London: Routledge, 2005), chap-
ters 2 and 4.
the creature alone. There is, in the end, something fully actual—the first
unmoved mover of Metaphysics Λ—which is the ultimate source of
motion. With regard to the movement of inanimate substances, what,
then, is the cause or source of that motion which is given by another? Its
form. The form, the “what it is to be something,” is the actualizing of the
potentiality of matter. It is the orientation of matter to certain ends rather
than others. Now, in the Physics Aristotle states that “if we were to think
of ‘existence’ as something august and good and desirable, we might think
of shortage as the evil contradiction of this good, but of matter as some-
thing the very nature of which is to desire and yearn towards the actu-
ally existent.”19 So matter, of its very nature, desires the good in the form
of the actually existent. However, some care is needed. Aristotle might be
read as claiming that something like Newtonian inert, base matter has
some kind of vitalistic force and, in the history of philosophy, much
energy has been invested in denying this claim. But this is not how he
understands hyle ˜, because such pure matter cannot be; it is always, in some
way, however attenuated, en-formed and its form orientates it towards
some ends and away from others. So it would be more correct to say that
matter through its form has an intrinsic appetition to certain ends. If Aris-
totle does have a notion of “vital force” which extends as well to the
inanimate as it does to the animate, that force is not something super-
added to material nature. It is intrinsic to any matter-form compound.
This understanding of dynamic substantial form orientated towards
certain ends can shed light on the notion of internal and external teleol-
ogy. It seems that, in the case of so-called animate substances, they real-
ize their end or goal of their own power. For example, unless hindered,
the boy will turn into a man and the acorn into an oak. The ascription
of causality to the telos in each case—the man and the oak tree—would,
in Kantian terms, be a merely heuristic device which, in order to be
properly explanatory, should be reduced to efficient causes. To take
another example, namely that of a sculptor fashioning a block of marble,
the goal appears to be external in the mind of the sculptor. The marble
is purely passive or inert. The fashioning of the sculpture belongs to the
sculptor as efficient cause and any sense of teleological orientation is
“borrowed” from the intentional action of the sculptor. The goal of
providing a focus of devotion in the church does not belong so much to
the matter out of which the sculpture is being fashioned as it does to the
sculptor who has been commissioned to provide a stature of the Virgin
Mary. However, is the block of marble contributing only the material
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19 Aristotle, Physics I.9, 192a19–a23.
cause? Is the form of the marble, even in its unfashioned state, not also
contributing at least in the sense of being orientated towards certain ends
and not others? The sculptor could not fashion the marble into a tree or
a pen, but he can fashion it into a statue or a plinth. Why? Because the
form “marble” is not purely potential but is orientated towards certain
ends and not others. The goal, therefore, is not entirely external in the
sculptor’s intention, lying outside the material object being fashioned, but
is also held in a potential form within the matter-form compound.
So there is a sense in which, even concerning human artefacts, there is
an element of intrinsic purposiveness because the object in question
provides not only the material cause but also the formal cause which is
dynamically orientated towards certain ends rather than others. And we
must remember that the form is the final cause. As Aristotle would say,
there will always be a striving for the good. This does not mean, however,
that the orexis in en-formed matter takes the form of a superadded effi-
cient cause, which is the way in which such kinds of vitalism are often
understood. It remains a formal cause which is at once also the final cause.
However, there is a reading of Aristotle which suggests that teleological
causation is entirely intrinsic and restricted to particular organisms. In other
words, there is no element of extrinsic or cosmic teleology.20 This would
not only suggest the self-sufficiency of nature but also hint at the self-suffi-
ciency of individual organisms. One argument marshalled in favor of this
reading is that Aristotle is clearly opposed to Plato’s notion of a transcen-
dent realm of Forms and what is sometimes called the paradigmatic cause.
Through a literal reading of the Demiurge in the Timaeus and Plato’s prior-
itization of art over nature, Plato is sometimes understood by his modern
readers as offering a kind of design argument for the existence of a creat-
ing deity. The Demiurge forms the cosmos from the khora according to an
eternal model or set of “paradigms.” So the Forms after which the universe
is created act as extrinsic final causes. Aristotle does indeed reject various
theories of the Forms, some of them not being readily identifiable within
Plato’s texts. However, it is possible briefly to highlight the key reasons why
Aristotle maintains a view of transcendent, cosmic teleology which
balances his view of nature as an intrinsic formal and final cause.21
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20 For a recent example of this approach, see Monte Ransom Johnson, Aristotle on
Teleology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), especially chap. 9.
21 Space prohibits a detailed discussion of this matter. For a more thorough treatment,
see Lloyd Gerson, Aristotle and Other Platonists (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2005), 122–30 and David Sedley, “Teleology, Aristotelian and Platonic,” in Being,
Nature, and Life in Aristotle: Essays in Honor of Allan Gotthelf, ed. James G. Lennox and
Robert Bolton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5–29.
In Metaphysics ΛAristotle discusses the nature of the good and whether
that good is something separated, or whether it is immanent within the
order of things: “We must also consider in which sense the nature of the
universe contains the good or the supreme good; whether as something
separate and independent, or as the orderly arrangement of its parts.”22 He
uses the example of an army: does its good lie in the ordered relation of
the soldiers, or in the general who stands above them, or in both? Aris-
totle concludes that the good lies in both, but more in the general because
“he is not due to the order, but the order is due to him.” In any order,
Aristotle concludes that all things are jointly ordered with respect to one
thing in which they all share or participate (pros hen).23 For some inter-
preters, this seems to imply that the good is immanent in the individual
members of any order by virtue of the individuals they are. However, Aris-
totle surely wants to point out that all individuals work towards a good
which transcends their individuality and constitutes a good for the whole.
This would certainly be true of Aristotle’s politics in which an individual
realizes his good by realizing the good of the city which exists “for the
good life.”24 More importantly, it should be remembered that Aristotle
does not think in terms of separated and discrete systems in either culture
or nature. So we might say that any given order composed of individuals
(say that of an army regiment) will itself be part of a wider order (say a
nation’s army) and work for its own good, which is constituted also by the
good of the whole. So for any given order, there is yet another good
which transcends that particular order. Aristotle can therefore state in the
De Anima that “every creature strives for this [the divine], and for the sake
of this performs all its natural functions.”25 This maintains the distinction
described earlier, namely between the goal as the aim of an action (the
share in the divine) and the goal as the beneficiary (the creature whose
nature is thereby actualized). The former denotes the external “reach” of
the creature; the latter indicates an immanent fulfilment.
While it seems there are good reasons for concluding that Aristotle
avoids a dualistic separation of intrinsic and extrinsic teleology, is a distinc-
tion not important for identifying those things which are by nature
(which have an internal principle of motion and rest) as opposed to
human artefacts whose principles of motion and rest are external? In Aris-
totelian terms, it can be said that the more exclusively external the prin-
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22 Aristotle, Metaphysics XII.10, 1075a12–a15.
23 Aristotle, Metaphysics XII.10, 1075a19: “πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἓν ἅπαντα συντέτακται . . .”
24 See Aristotle, Politics I.1, 1252b29–1253a19.
25 Aristotle, De anima, trans. W. S. Hett (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1957), II.4, 415b1–b3, cited in Gerson, Aristotle and Other Platonists, 124.
ciples of any artefact, the more “violent” is the human use of nature, which
is to say that the artefact involves the “forcing” of nature which is contrary
to its internal principle of motion and rest. In such artefacts, nature
contributes little if anything to the final product. The telos of any such
product lies more particularly in the mind of the human artisan; less is
contributed by the form of any substance used for the production of the
artefact. However, Aristotle does identify forms of artisanship in which the
imitation of nature becomes particularly apparent. In the second book of
the Physics, he discusses the way in which the earlier and successive stages
of natural operations are collectively performed for the achievement of a
particular end. The same can be said of art. In both cases, the end will be
achieved as long as there are no impediments to the realization of the goal.
Human artisanship may involve the removal of impediments to the natu-
ral achievement of certain goals. Aristotle concludes that “as a general
proposition, the arts either, on the basis of Nature, carry things further
than Nature can, or they imitate Nature. If, then, artificial processes are
purposeful, so are natural processes too; for the relation of antecedent to
consequent is identical in art and in Nature.”26
In this comment, Aristotle is saying a little more than simply “art
imitates nature.” Art, we are told, “carries things further than nature can.”
Yet art will certainly look like nature in as much as the relation of
antecedent and consequent is the same. This means that art at its best will
see itself as a consequent continuation or consummation of what has
already been achieved by an antecedent nature. While we may distinguish
between intrinsic and extrinsic teleology in such circumstances, the two
are not juxtaposed. On the contrary, in the greatest artisanship an extrin-
sic teleology extends and perfects an instrinsic natural teleology.
Having sketched these aspects of Aristotle’s understanding of final causes
in nature and human deliberation, I now turn to consider Aquinas’s use of
this philosophy of nature within his doctrine of grace.
Aquinas and the Teleology of Grace
It is a commonplace to state that Aquinas’s understanding of both nature
and human action is teleological. At the very beginning of his commen-
tary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Aquinas states that
. . . a twofold order is found in things. One kind is that of parts of a
whole, that is, a group, among themselves, as the parts of a house are
mutually ordered to each other. The second order is that of things to
an end. This order is of greater importance than the first. For, as the
Aquinas and Aristotle’s Teleology 859
26 Aristotle, Physics II.8, 199a15–a20.
Philosopher says in the eleventh book of the Metaphysics [Metaphysics
Λ], the order of the parts of an army among themselves exists because
of the order of the whole army to the commander.27
In the relatively early treatise De veritate, Thomas asks, “Do all things tend
towards the good?”28 He uses the example of an arrow which is directed
to its target by an archer. In this case, the arrow receives no “form” from
that which moves it and such motion is regarded as violent. He also consid-
ers a second case in which “what is directed or inclined to an end acquires
from the director or mover some form by which such an inclination
belongs to it.”29 So Aquinas, following Aristotle, concludes that “he who
gave heaviness to the stone inclined it to be borne downward naturally. In
this way, the one who begets them is the mover in regard to heavy and light
things, according to the Philosopher in the eighth book of the Physics.”30
Aquinas goes on to say that, even in the case of inanimate things, there is a
sense in which all things, by virtue of the form which is donated to them,
seek their due ends by co-operating with that which moves them. Things
are not simply led to the good; they tend towards it by virtue of their own
formal nature. Recapitulating Aristotle’s sense of orexis in all natural
substances, he states, “To desire or have appetency is nothing else but to
strive for something, to stretch, as it were, toward something which is
destined for oneself.”31 The notion of “stretching” (tendere) is important
because it suggests far more than a general inclination towards something.
Rather, it implies an ecstatic striving for the good in which something
continually exceeds itself as it moves towards actuality.
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27 Aquinas, Sententia libri Ethicorum, I.1.1: “Invenitur autem duplex ordo in rebus.
Unus quidem partium alicuius totius seu alicuius multitudinis adinvicem, sicut
partes domus ad invicem ordinantur; alius autem est ordo rerum in finem. Et hic
ordo est principalior, quam primus. Nam, ut philosophus dicit in XI metaphysi-
cae, ordo partium exercitus adinvicem, est propter ordinem totius exercitus ad
ducem.” Translation (slightly adapted) by C. I. Litzinger, O.P., in Aquinas, Commen-
tary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: Dumb Ox Books, 1993).
28 Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, 22.1.
29 Ibid., responsio: “aliquando autem id quod dirigitur vel inclinatur in finem,
consequitur a dirigente vel movente aliquam formam per quam sibi talis incli-
natio competat.” Translations (with minor amendments) are by Richard W.
Schmidt, S.J., in St. Thomas Aquinas, Truth,Vol. 3 (Indianapolis: Hackett Publish-
ing Company, 1994). 
30 Ibid.: “sicut ille qui dedit lapidi gravitatem, inclinavit ipsum ad hoc quod deor-
sum naturaliter ferretur; per quem modum generans est motor in gravibus et
levibus, secundum philosophum in Lib. VIII Physic.”
31 Ibid.: “appetere autem nihil aliud est quam aliquid petere quasi tendere in aliq-
uid ad ipsum ordinatum.”
There is, of course, a crucial difference between Aquinas and Aristotle
concerning the guidance of natural substances towards their final end in
God: creation. Whereas Aristotle taught that the cosmos is of everlasting
time, having neither beginning nor end, and whereas Aquinas regarded
this position as rationally coherent, nevertheless Christian theology main-
tains that God creates ex nihilo. As such, God is not simply the self-
contemplating unmoved mover who is the ultimate desire of natural
substances but rather the creative source of all things. The doctrine of
creation ex nihilo refers not only to a beginning of creation but also to
the sustaining of created being at every moment. For Aquinas, created
being is, in itself, nothing.32 Creation “is” only by virtue of an improper
participation in being itself through a continual divine donation. Even
with respect to existence (and not simply motion or desire), all things are,
for Aquinas, teleologically orientated pros hen—towards one focus,
namely being itself. The implication for an Aristotelian teleology trans-
posed into the context of creation ex nihilo is that the form, which, in its
potential guise, is the internal principle of the motion of a natural
substance to its proper end, finds its ultimate origin and goal in God.33
This means that the distinction between “internal” and “external” with
respect to creation does not imply a self-sufficient or autonomous natu-
ral realm. The form by which natural substances make their motion
towards their ultimate end in God their own motion is itself the result of
God’s gift of created being ex nihilo. The distinction between internal and
external is therefore somewhat akin to Aristotle’s distinction between
matter and form: just as matter is nothing without form, so too creation
is nothing outside of its participation in the divine ideas.
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32 Aquinas, Scriptum super Sententiis, book II, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, responsio: “Secundum
est, ut in re quae creari dicitur, prius sit non esse quam esse: non quidem prior-
itate temporis vel durationis, ut prius non fuerit et postmodum sit; sed prioritate
naturae, ita quod res creata si sibi relinquatur, consequatur non esse, cum esse non
habeat nisi ex influentia causae superioris.” (Secondly, in the thing that is said to
be created, non-being is prior to being. This is not a temporal priority or one of
duration, such that what was not before is later, but a priority of nature, so that
if the created thing were left to itself, it would consequently not exist, for it has
its being only from the causality of the superior cause.)
33 See Aquinas, ST I, q. 15. Lloyd Gerson has shown how the Neoplatonic tradi-
tion (particularly Simplicius) sees a harmony between Aristotle and Plato
concerning the paradigmatic cause as long as the paradigm, or divine idea, or
Form, is not understood univocally with the forms of individual substances. In
other words, the Third Man argument can be resisted by claiming that, for exam-
ple, the Form of horse is not simply another horse. See Lloyd Gerson, Aristotle
and Other Platonists (n. 21), 119.
With regard to the combination of appetition and guidance towards
the good as a final cause, it is within Aquinas’s doctrine of grace that he
makes explicit use of Aristotle’s teleological physics for theological
purposes.34 For creatures which do not possess knowledge and under-
standing, the teleological structure of their actions is straightforward: they
imitate the divine by tending towards the actualization of their particu-
lar form.35 A heavy object will fall, a bird will fly, and a lion will hunt in
accordance with their natures, such behavior springing spontaneously
and easily without the need for any kind of deliberation. The goal of their
actions is connatural and those actions are achieved by habitual activity
which emerges from a formal nature. For humanity, however, the situa-
tion is more complex because, although our ultimate end is a vision of
the universal good which we will of necessity, the achievement of that
good is by means of particular and contingent goods.36 Unlike the
universal good, those particular goods are not good from every point of
view; humanity must pick its way through this thicket in order to achieve
its end. Deliberation concerning the appropriate path to the good is
undertaken through interactions of will and intellect.37 These motions
are collected to form habits (Aristotle’s hexis), which Aquinas refer to as
virtues. Such habits, which are acquired through repetition, practice, and
training, are the result of an appropriate blend of intellective and appeti-
tive powers of the soul which actualize a formal nature. Habits (such as
the habit of generosity or the habit of learning) may be possessed with
more or less intensity; the greater the intensity of a habit, the swifter and
easier will be the motion to something’s end by virtue of that habit.38
However, the possession of habits known as virtues is insufficient for
humanity to achieve its ultimate end. While there are ends which are
connatural to man such as the building of dwellings and the formation of
friendships—these being achieved through acquired virtue—because of
the corruption of human nature even these connatural ends are difficult
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34 A more detailed examination of Aquinas’s deployment of Aristotelian motion in
the realms of virtue and grace can be found in Simon Oliver, “The Sweet
Delight of Virtue and Grace in Aquinas’s Ethics,” in International Journal of System-
atic Theology 7(1) (2005): 52–71. 
35 Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 1, a. 8, responsio.
36 Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 10, a. 2, responsio; ad 2 and 3.
37 Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 14, a. 1. For a recent lucid account of this process, see Steven
A. Long, The Teleological Grammar of the Moral Act (Naples, FL: Sapientia Press of
Ave Maria University, 2007).
38 Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 52, a. 2, responsio; Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus, q. 1,
responsio.
to achieve.39 However, humanity’s goal is beatitude, a vision of the eter-
nal good and a partaking in the divine nature for “final and perfect beat-
itude can consist in nothing else than the vision of the divine essence.”40
This is connatural to God alone and is therefore beyond the nature of
humanity. In describing this end, Aquinas uses Aristotle’s distinction
between the goal as the aim of an action and the goal as the beneficiary
of an action.41 First, there is the thing in itself which we desire to attain;
secondly, there is the benefit which is enjoyed by that which achieves the
desired end. Humanity’s end is therefore twofold. In the first sense, it is
an eternal and uncreated reality, namely God whose infinite goodness is
our greatest desire. In the second sense, humanity’s end is a creaturely
reality in us which is the enjoyment of the vision of God. However, for
any being to tend towards its end, it must have not only a natural appe-
tition for that end and the appropriate motion but also a nature propor-
tionate to that end. In other words, if the form is the final cause, a natural
substance must have that form potentially and internally. While human-
ity has a natural desire for the beatific vision, it has no intrinsic proper
potency to sharing in the divine nature. It appears that the final end of
humanity is defined, and yet it is not achievable. Yet for Aquinas it is
impossible for a natural desire to be incapable of fulfilment.42 Therefore,
it seems that humanity is in need of a double aid, first to achieve even
that which is connatural and, secondly, to attain its ultimate end in the
vision of God which is beyond even humanity’s incorrupt nature.
In explaining how God moves humanity to its ultimate end in the
beatific vision, Aquinas deploys Aristotle’s natural philosophy. His doctrine
of grace, in which concepts are deployed analogically in new ways, is there-
fore in an important sense a continuation of his wider understanding of the
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39 Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 109, a. 2, responsio: “Sed in statu naturae integrae, quantum
ad sufficientiam operativae virtutis, poterat homo per sua naturalia velle et oper-
ari bonum suae naturae proportionatum, quale est bonum virtutis acquisitae, non
autem bonum superexcedens, quale est bonum virtutis infusae. Sed in statu natu-
rae corruptae etiam deficit homo ab hoc quod secundum suam naturam potest,
ut non possit totum huiusmodi bonum implere per sua naturalia.” (But in the
state of perfect nature, as regards the sufficiency of the operative power, man by
his natural endowments could wish and do the good proportionate to his nature,
such as the good of acquired virtue; but not surpassing good, as the good of
infused virtue. But in the state of corrupt nature, man falls short of what he could
do by his nature, so that he cannot fulfil it by his own natural powers.)
40 Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 3, a. 8, responsio: “ultima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse
nisi in visione divinae essentiae.”
41 Aquinas, ST, I–II, q. 3, a. 2, responsio.
42 Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles III, 51, 1.
natural world to which humanity belongs. Things are moved by God in
two senses.43 First, while all corporeal motion is reduced the motion of the
first heaven, all motion, whether corporeal or incorporeal (for example, the
motion of thought), is reduced to the divine first unmoved mover. In addi-
tion to this, all formal perfection is from God as first act. In other words,
all things are moved by receiving the form whereby they make that motion
their own. Of course, in receiving that formal nature from God any natu-
ral substances at once receive their own end or final cause because “the
form is the final cause.” Aquinas sums this up in his commentary on Aris-
totle’s Physics: “it is clear that nature is nothing but a certain kind of art, i.e.,
the divine art, impressed upon things, by which these things are moved to
a determinate end. It is as if the shipbuilder were able to give to timbers
that by which they would move themselves to take the form of a ship.”44
Therefore, with respect to divine creativity and the motion of nature,
the division between internal and external principles, and likewise intrin-
sic and extrinsic teleology, appears much less definitive than in the case
of nature and human artefacts. Although God provides the external end
of all things, nevertheless the divine is also the immediate and primary
source of nature’s substantial forms which are internal to substances.
Although God moves all things to their requisite ends, he does so
through the fulfilment of a formal nature in such a way that this motion
becomes genuinely the creature’s own. Were God to move a creature to
its requisite end without that motion also being an expression of some-
thing’s formal nature, the motion would, in Aristotelian terms, be violent
and from a purely external source. Yet divine providence is not of this
kind; it is at once divine and natural through the act of creation ex nihilo.
The importance of God as first unmoved mover and also the source of
the form of natural substances whereby they make their actualization their
own, is particularly important with respect to humanity’s motion to beat-
itude. As we have noted, humanity cannot achieve its ultimate end—
because of its corrupt nature, but more particularly because the vision of
God is connatural to God alone. If humanity were moved directly to the
beatific vision, this would constitute a violent motion, because human
nature would not, of itself, contribute anything to this movement through
its form. Therefore, explains Aquinas, for humanity to achieve its ultimate
end prepared by God we require not only the requisite motion and some-
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43 Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 109, a. 1.
44 Aquinas, In libros Physicorum, II, lecture14: “Unde patet quod natura nihil est aliud
quam ratio cuiusdam artis, scilicet divinae, indita rebus, qua ipsae res moventur
ad finem determinatum: sicut si artifex factor navis posset lignis tribuere, quod
ex se ipsis moverentur ad navis formam inducendam.”
thing which inclines the appetite towards that end, but also “some super-
natural form and perfection must be superadded to man whereby he may
be ordered suitably to the aforesaid end.”45 In addition to God moving
humanity to its appropriate end, grace is also given as an “habitual gift,”
namely a form or nature by which humanity can move and be moved to
the supernatural end appointed by God. As we have seen, God’s provi-
dence extends to creatures not simply by moving them to their appropri-
ate ends but also through the bestowal of forms and powers by which they
make that motion their own. Similarly, God provides his grace by which
humanity may make its motion to beatitude its own. Importantly, with
regard to natural bodies, “the movements whereby they are moved by God
become connatural and easy to creatures, according to Wisdom 8:1: ‘she .
. . orders all things sweetly.’ ”46 So too, by analogy, God “infuse[s] into such
as he moves towards the acquisition of supernatural good, certain forms or
supernatural qualities, whereby they may be moved by him sweetly and
promptly to acquire eternal good.”47 This grace is not a superadded effi-
cient cause but a formal cause which is therefore internal. In a curious
way, the motion to beatitude becomes “natural” in the sense that it
genuinely belongs to the creature. The supernatural becomes natural, and
the natural becomes supernatural.
Aquinas’s distinction between operating and co-operating grace can also
be seen to reflect Aristotelian teleology and the contrast between the goal
as the aim of an action and the goal as the beneficiary.48 Grace is described
as “operative” when, for example, God moves the will interiorly. This oper-
ation is attributed to God alone; the divine is the mover, the human will is
moved. When humanity moves and is moved towards beatitude, such grace
is described as “co-operating.” Although the interior act of the movement
of the will is attributed to God, this in turn issues in an exterior act which
is the will’s own motion. For example, the human mind may be interiorly
moved to will the good (operative grace), which in turn issues in an exter-
nal act of generosity to one in need (co-operating grace). This latter variety
of grace is described as “co-operating” because the divine co-operates with
Aquinas and Aristotle’s Teleology 865
45 Aquinas, ScG III, 150, 5: “Ergo oportet quod homini superaddatur aliqua super-
naturalis forma et perfectio, per quam convenienter ordinetur in finem praedic-
tum.” See also De veritate, q. 27, a. 2, responsio.
46 Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 110, a. 2, responsio: “Et sic motus quibus a Deo moventur,
fiunt creaturis connaturales et faciles; secundum illud Sap. VIII, et disponit omnia
suaviter.”
47 Ibid.: “Multo igitur magis illis quos movet ad consequendum bonum supernatu-
rale aeternum, infundit aliquas formas seu qualitates supernaturales, secundum quas
suaviter et prompte ab ipso moveantur ad bonum aeternum consequendum.”
48 Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 111, a. 2, responsio.
the proper motion of the human will. God is the primary cause of both the
interior and exterior motion of the will, yet with regard to the exterior
motion the human will becomes a real and potent secondary cause of its
own action. Such motions, when practiced and repeated, collectively
become what Aquinas calls an “habitual gift.” Such habits are actualizations
of a formal human nature so that the works of grace spring naturally from
that form. The habit can be characterized as the goal of an action although
the actions proceeding from that habitual gift (for example, meritorious
works) are beneficial to the agent and the patient. So for Aquinas, “habitual
grace, insofar as it heals and justifies the soul, or makes it pleasing to God, is
called operating grace; but inasmuch as it is the principle of meritorious
works, which proceed from the free-will, it is called cooperating grace.”49
In referring to habitual grace, Aquinas is utilizing the Aristotelian
concept of habit (hexis) which refers principally to the way in which a
natural substance “holds” or “possesses” itself. Such habits are not the
mindless repetition of particular actions but the fullest expression of
something’s nature. A concert pianist, for example, plays the piano after
countless hours of repetition and practice, and does so as it were “by
habit,” without deliberation as her hands move across the keyboard. Yet
when a pianist of this calibre plays the piano, she does not forget herself.
On the contrary, this is the full actualization of the pianist’s form when
she “possesses” herself and is most self-aware. Similarly, with respect to
habitual grace, these habits which make us pleasing to God and lead to
meritorious works may be performed without deliberation with ease and
delight (like a well-practiced pianist), and yet they are the fullest expres-
sion of someone’s inner nature. Although the interior principle and the
exterior source and goal can be distinguished, they remain also unified.
Conclusion
In beginning this essay, I described the way in which the distinction
between internal and external teleology was important for Aristotle in
identifying those things which “are by nature” from human artefacts.
While art imitates nature, nevertheless the teleological orientation of
those products of human intention and design is substantially exterior. A
tree has within itself its own principle of motion and rest such that it
moves itself from potency to actuality and the achievement of its proper
end, whereas boats and houses do not make themselves. For Aristotle,
neither internal nor external teleology is intelligible without a concept
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49 Ibid.: “habitualis gratia, inquantum animam sanat vel iustificat, sive gratam Deo facit,
dicitur gratia operans, inquantum vero est principium operis meritorii, quod etiam
ex libero arbitrio procedit, dicitur cooperans.”
of dynamic substantial form. For those things which are by nature, the
form is interior to the natural substance and contains, in its potential
aspect, the end or goal of that substance. The form is the principle of the
motion from potency towards actuality and the achievement of the
requisite end. Concerning human artefacts, the form lies exteriorly in the
mind of the artisan and, by intentional design and through the efficient
causation of the use of his tools, the human manufacturer brings about
the actualization of a form which is not intrinsic to the natural substances
used in the process of making.
However, we saw reason to note the ways in which this distinction is
not dualistic for Aristotle, for art and nature are not necessarily juxtaposed
but can come closer together. This can be seen most particularly in the
appetition (orexis) of both inanimate and animate substances towards
particular ends and also in the extrinsic cosmic teleological orientation
of all things towards the unity of the good. When Aristotle speaks of the
tree’s desire to bear fruit, a heavy object’s search for the lowest place, or
the marble’s intended fulfilment in a work of art, he does so using
language belonging particularly to the intentionality of sentient crea-
tures. Yet his use of such language is not entirely metaphorical. Material
nature is never indifferent or inert; by virtue of its form, it is always
already orientated to certain ends. As such, material substances, even the
inanimate, can contribute something to the achievement of a goal which
belongs also to the intention of a human artisan. In certain instances of
human artisanship “art may carry things further than nature can” in such
a way that the teleology of human creativity can see the internal and the
external perfectly united. The human artefact is at once the actualization
of the natural materials and also the realization of the intended goal of
the artisan. Therefore, the distinction between internal and external tele-
ology is not so much a dualistic division for Aristotle as a way of distin-
guishing certain kinds of natural behavior from artificial creations, while
also recognizing the possibility that, in certain kinds of human art,
perhaps the highest human art, the boundary between nature and art is
very delicate.
Nevertheless, the distinction between internal and external teleology
becomes important in early modern philosophy because it allows the
formal differentiation of mind and matter. Whereas material nature is
subject only to efficient causation, the intentional operation of mind is
governed by goals discerned by discursive reason. Teleology is a merely
heuristic device for the understanding of those aspects of material nature
whose explanation cannot be reduced to efficient causality. This much
stronger division between the different varieties of teleology, in which
Aquinas and Aristotle’s Teleology 867
the internal is reduced to a more fundamental variety of causation,
underlines a distinction between human culture, which is orientated
towards certain ends, and nature, which is determined and mechanistic.
Nature thereby becomes a discrete and self-sufficient realm. Transposed
into a theological key, this leads to two characteristically modern points
of view. The first is a teleological argument for God’s existence, which
understands the divine design of the cosmos as an external teleology
which is layered upon a discrete material substratum after the fashion of
certain kinds of human artifice. The second is also related to the notion
of a self-sufficient nature that features its own internal teleological orien-
tation to which is added an external and essentially foreign teleology in
the form of grace.50
Aquinas deploys Aristotelian teleology to understand both nature and
grace. As with Aristotle, there is no division of internal and external tele-
ology in such a way that nature becomes a self-sufficient and autonomous
domain. Nevertheless, although Aquinas can follow Aristotle’s notion that
all things are orientated exteriorly pros hen, towards the unity of a tran-
scendent good, he can associate that transcendence more clearly with
immanence because of the Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo. The
primary cause, which infuses itself more deeply in things than all second-
ary causes,51 is the immediate and intimate sustaining source of the being
of all creatures. This means that, at every moment, no creature explains its
own existence; instead, every creature points beyond itself to the eternal
simplicity of being itself. God is therefore infused most intimately into the
heart of every substance through both matter and form. Through the
donation of form, which includes the potential orientation to specific
ends in the imitation of the divine, God is the source of both the internal
and external teleological orientations of creatures. As Aquinas states, God
is the supreme artisan in which the internal and external are perfectly
unified, for “it is as if the shipbuilder were able to give to timbers that by
which they would move themselves to take the form of a ship.”
Likewise, Aquinas’s doctrine of grace does not involve the establish-
ment of a teleology which is wholly foreign and external to nature.52 By
grace, human nature is “stretched” to take on an enhanced form capable
of making motion to its ultimate end its own through both operative
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50 On this issue in the thought of Henri de Lubac, see John Milbank, The Suspended
Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate concerning the Supernatural (London: SCM,
2005), 20–22.
51 Aquinas, Super librum De causis expositio, lectio 1: “Omnis causa primaria plus est
influens super suum causatum quam causa secunda universalis.”
52 Aquinas, ScG III, 54, 8.
and, crucially, co-operative grace. Once again, the divine is both imma-
nent in the transformation of human nature for its motion to beatitude,
and transcendent in constituting the infinite end of humanity’s deepest
desire. However, is there another way in which Aquinas can specify theo-
logically the intimate infusion of divine goodness into human nature in
such a way that internal and external teleology are united in a mode
beyond Aristotelian philosophy? Such a fusion we find in the Incarna-
tion, for God is so immanent within human nature that he joins that
nature to his own through the hypostatic union (that is, not by mixing
but by uniting), while at the same time indicating humanity’s final end in
the wedding feast of the Lamb. Christ, in being the way, the truth, and
the life ( John 14:6) is both the intimation of our final end and the very
means to that end.
Christ becomes the source of both freely bestowed and sanctifying
grace.53 Freely bestowed grace is that variety which is for the co-opera-
tion of human beings with one another, for example, when a Christian
teacher moves another to God by example or prophecy. Christ offers this
variety of grace because “it was necessary for man to be firmly grounded
in virtue to receive from God made human both the teaching and the
examples of virtue.”54 Yet Christ is more than a good teacher and fine
example; he is also the source of sanctifying grace, that variety by which
God directly orders humanity to its final end. This is delivered through
the Church, Christ’s Body, of which he is the head: “Christ and his
members are one mystical person. Consequently, the works of the head
are in some way the works of the members.”55 By the sacraments of the
New Law, and particularly the reception of the Eucharist, that grace of
Christ is communicated into the body of the Church for the orientation
of its members to their final end in the vision of God and “for that reason
it was fitting that the grace which overflows from the incarnate Word
should be given to us by means of certain external sensible objects; and
that from this inward grace, whereby the flesh is subjected to the Spirit,
certain external works should ensue.”56 In the sacramental reality of the
Church, the distinction between an internal teleological orientation to
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53 Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 111, aa. 4 and 5.
54 Aquinas, ScG IV, 54, 7: “Unde necessarium fuit homini, ad hoc quod in virtute
firmaretur, quod a Deo humanato doctrinam et exempla virtutis acciperet.”
55 Aquinas, De veritate, q. 29, a. 7, ad 11: “Christus et membra eius sunt una persona
mystica, unde opera capitis sunt aliquo modo membrorum.”
56 Aquinas, ST I–II, q. 108, a. 1, responsio: “Et ideo convenit ut per aliqua exteri-
ora sensibilia gratia a verbo incarnato profluens in nos deducatur; et ex hac inte-
riori gratia, per quam caro spiritui subditur, exteriora quaedam opera sensibilia
producantur.”
beatitude belonging intimately (yet by grace) to humanity, and an exter-
nal teleology which “stretches” to both the natural creation and the
eschaton, is brought into a perfect unity by the creative and redemptive
act of God.
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